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No settlement without a proactive policy: 
The European Union and the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space 
 
Barbara Gaweda / Marco Siddi
Twenty-one years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the international community has not yet 
managed to solve the four separatist conflicts that 
broke out in the wake of the USSR’s demise. With 
the help of their patron states (Russia and, in the 
case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia), the self-
proclaimed Republics of Transnistria, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have 
become de facto states with separate political 
institutions and economic structures.
The existence of these entities, which 
have obtained very limited or no international 
recognition, constitutes a security challenge 
for EU countries. Following the launch of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2006, 
the European Union has become more involved 
in the resolution of the four conflicts. The ENP 
Action Plans with Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia set a list of priorities for the EU 
to contribute to conflict resolution. Brussels 
deployed border monitoring missions in Moldova 
and Georgia in 2005 and 2008 respectively. In 
addition, it attempted to increase its presence in 
the field by appointing Special Representatives 
for Moldova, the South Caucasus and the 2008 
crisis in Georgia. 
Nevertheless, the EU has been unable to 
break the stalemate in negotiations and make a 
significant contribution to conflict resolution. The 
2008 war in Georgia showed that the conflicts can 
“unfreeze” and escalate in regional wars. Since 
Brussels has considerable interests in the regions 
where the secessionist republics are located, 
both in terms of energy security and stability in 
the neighbourhood, a more proactive EU role is 
necessary. Based on recent developments in the 
four separatist conflicts, we have developed five 
recommendations on how the EU could become 
more active.
Recent developments 
Abkhazia
Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, both the 
European Union and Russia have maintained their 
respective positions vis-à-vis Abkhazia. Brussels 
has not recognized the authorities in Sukhumi, 
while Moscow has established diplomatic relations 
and provided military and economic support. The 
EU and NATO refused to recognise the elections 
in Abkhazia that were held in August 2011 and 
saw Alexander Ankvab earn a resounding victory, 
with 55 percent of the votes. The election results 
were rejected by Catherine Ashton, the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. Ashton reiterated 
the EU’s “support to the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Georgia, as recognised by 
international law”. On the other hand, Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev congratulated 
Ankvab heartily. In March 2012, the 19th round 
of the Geneva International Discussions on the 
crisis in Georgia closed with a joint statement by 
the three co-chairs, EU Special Representative 
Philippe Lefort, OSCE Chairmanship’s Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus Pádraig 
Murphy, and UN Special Representative Antti 
Turunen. They outlined a number of unsubstantial 
achievements of the working groups taking part 
in discussions, including a review of the security 
situation on the ground, which they assessed as 
relatively stable. Apparently, the participants 
also tabled a new contribution in the context of 
the discussion on non-use of force commitments. 
However, no details were disclosed. The 
deliberations on these topics are to be resumed at 
the next round of talks in June 2012. 
South Ossetia
Similar to Abkhazia, there has been no change 
in the EU’s and Russia’s policies toward South 
Ossetia. In November 2011, the EU once again 
stressed that it recognizes neither South Ossetia 
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nor the presidential elections that were held in the 
separatist republic that month. In fact, the elections 
were invalidated by the Supreme Court of South 
Ossetia and rescheduled for March and April 
2012. The winner of the November 2011 elections, 
Alla Dzhioyeva, refused to accept the Supreme 
Court’s decision, but withdrew from the political 
struggle after her office was raided by the police in 
February 2012. The spring 2012 elections saw the 
victory of Leonid Tibilov, the former head of South 
Ossetia’s security service. Both the EU and the US 
denied recognition to the choice. Tibilov is said to 
be loyal to Russia. He has already announced that 
he would like to unify South Ossetia with its sister 
republic North Ossetia, a federal subject of Russia. 
However, it is more likely that Russia will continue 
to exert indirect influence rather than annexing the 
separatist province. Its military presence in both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia allows the Kremlin to 
keep US-backed Georgian aspirations of joining 
NATO in check.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not witnessed 
any significant developments, except for the 
persistent armed skirmishes along the ceasefire line. 
Nagorno-Karabakh remains one of the most tense 
and volatile regions in the post-Soviet space and 
is strongly influenced by changes in the “balance 
of power” between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 
the international scene. March 2012 saw a series 
of meetings and visits to Yerevan, Baku and 
Nagorno-Karabakh by the OSCE Minsk Group, 
which is headed by a co-chairmanship consisting 
of France, Russia and the United States and has 
been set up to encourage a peaceful, negotiated 
resolution to the conflict. The joint statements 
of Presidents Medvedev, Obama and Sarkozy at 
L‘Aquila in 2009, Muskoka in 2010, and Deauville 
in 2011 outlined elements of a framework for a 
comprehensive peace settlement. However, the 
mediation attempts of Russia (Kazan, June 2011) 
and the OSCE Minsk Group (Vilnius, December 
2011) have not produced any significant results. 
The January 2012 joint statement by Presidents 
Aliyev, Sargsyan and Medvedev in Sochi expressed 
a seeming commitment of the two belligerent 
sides to accelerate efforts to reach agreement 
on the Basic Principles1. The Minsk Group has 
been trying to urge the leaders of the sides to 
complete work on the framework agreement and 
the subsequent final settlement as soon as possible. 
Despite these high-level meetings, the ceasefire 
agreement is being breached on a regular basis 
by both sides. Major incidents involving fatalities 
occurred numerous times throughout 2010 and 
2011. In a sign of what can be seen as growing 
tensions, Armenia announced it would pull out of 
the 2012 Eurovision song contest in Azerbaijan. 
Transnistria
The turn of 2011 and 2012 seemed a moment when 
conflict resolution in Transnistria would finally 
gain some traction, but is increasingly proving to 
be another missed opportunity. The negotiations 
on the Transnistrian conflict, which happen in a 
“5+2” format (and include Moldova, Transnistria, 
Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, plus the European 
Union and the United States as observers), have 
been stalled from 2006 to late 2011. In December 
2011, the first formal talks since 2006 took place 
in Vilnius under the auspices of the Lithuanian 
OSCE chairmanship. However, the meetings saw 
low expectations from the outset and yielded no 
clear result. Later that month, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, 
a relatively new face in Transnistrian politics, 
won the elections in the separatist republic 
and replaced the long-standing president Igor 
Smirnov (who ruled for 21 years). A change of 
leadership also happened in Moldova. In March 
2012, after 3 years of deadlock, the Moldovan 
parliament elected Nicolae Timofti as president, 
a relatively neutral political figure. Timofti 
defeated the veteran Communist leader Vladimir 
Voronin. In a joint statement with Štefan Füle, the 
1 The Basic Principles were put forward by the OSCE mediators 
in 2007 and include: the return of the territories surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control (entailing the complete 
withdrawal of Armenian forces from five out of the seven occupied 
districts and a progressive withdrawal from a sixth one); a corridor 
linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; an interim status for 
Nagorno-Karabakh for 10-15 years, providing guarantees for 
security and self-governance; future determination of the final 
legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally-binding 
referendum; the right of all IDPs and refugees to return to their 
former places of residence; international security guarantees 
that would include a peacekeeping operation (numbering 
around 10,000). See the Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group 
Co-Chair countries, press release 10 July 2009, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/item/51152 (accessed on 12 August 2011).
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EU enlargement commissioner, the EU’s High 
Representative Catherine Ashton said that the vote 
would open up dialogue in the country. Also the 
Romanian President, Traian Băsescu, said he had 
assured Timofti of Romania‘s support for reform 
in Moldova and for moving closer to the EU. In 
view of this, it was hoped that the new leadership 
in both Chisinau and Tiraspol would help resolve 
the issue of Transnistria’s status.  Until now, 
none of the sides and of the mediators has taken 
the initiative. In any case, it is unlikely that the 
conflicting parties will reach an easy compromise 
on the status issue. Meanwhile, Russia confirmed 
that it attaches utmost importance to its relationship 
with Transnistria by appointing Dmitry Rogozin to 
the post of Special Envoy of the Russian President 
for Transnistria. Rogozin was a tough negotiating 
partner in his previous job at the NATO-Russia 
Council and is unlikely to make concessions on 
Russia’s interests in the area. 
What has the EU been doing so far?
The EU is keeping a close eye on the developments 
in the South Caucasus, in particular after the conflict 
in 2008. On 26 August 2011, the EU Council 
appointed Philippe Lefort Special Representative 
for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. 
Lefort replaced both Peter Semneby, former Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus, and Pierre 
Morel, previously Special Representative for the 
Crisis in Georgia. The European Union Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM) in Georgia has continued to 
operate at the demarcation line between Tbilisi’s 
separatist provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and rump Georgia. As a response to the EU’s 
refusal to recognize them, the two secessionist 
republics have not allowed EUMM to access to 
their territory. However, no major clashes have 
occurred on the demarcation line and EUMM has 
contributed to stabilize the ceasefire.
In May 2010, the European Parliament 
adopted a report by a Bulgarian Socialist MEP 
urging the EU to craft a strategy for the South 
Caucasus region. The report “The Need for a 
Strategy in the South Caucasus” stressed the 
EU’s obligation to be proactive with respect to 
stabilizing and encouraging the development of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since then, the 
European Parliament held debates on the situation 
in the regions in February and March 2012, but no 
concrete action followed as a result. Furthermore, 
the EU still plays no role in the negotiations of 
the OSCE Minsk Group for the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
With regard to the Transnistrian conflict, 
the EU’s border monitoring mission (EUBAM) 
has continued to operate along the Moldovan-
Ukrainian border, of which more than a third 
(454 kilometres) coincides with the Transnistrian-
Ukrainian border. EUBAM has proved successful 
at limiting human trafficking, smuggling and 
other illicit activities, which allegedly provided 
a considerable part of Transnistria’s revenues. 
However, the mission’s success is offset by the 
EU’s failure to build up a solid and continuous 
diplomatic representation in the region. In 
February 2011, Brussels abolished the post of 
Special Representative for Moldova. In addition, 
the former EU representative to the 5+2 talks on 
Transnistria, Miroslav Lajcak, is moving from 
the External Action Service to the post of Foreign 
Minister of Slovakia. This inevitably affects 
EU policy in the short run, at a time when the 
reactivation of the 5+2 talks and political changes 
in both Transnistria and Moldova may have 
opened a window of opportunity for progress in 
negotiations.
Recommendations
1. In order to play a more active role in these 
conflicts, the EU needs a coherent “Eastern 
Neighbourhood Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution Strategy”, clearly defining its 
interests, a common strategy and concrete 
road maps for implementation. The strategy 
should reiterate the EU’s commitment to 
territorial integrity under international law, 
but simultaneously offer guidelines for an 
increased dialogue and cooperation with the 
separatist entities.
2. The EU should accept that the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is irreversible 
and start economic and political dialogues 
with the authorities of the de facto states 
in order to gain access to and leverage on the 
breakaway entities.
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3. With regard to the Transnistrian conflict, the 
EU should match its economic leverage with 
bold diplomatic initiatives, which should 
result in a new and comprehensive peace plan 
that also takes into account Russian interests. 
Shevchuk’s recent election in Transnistria and 
the reactivation of the 5+2 negotiations have 
opened a window of opportunity that Brussels 
should exploit.
4. The EU should include the Transnistrian 
conflict in the agenda of the biannual EU-
Russia summits, where Brussels could make 
concessions in areas of high priority for Russia, 
such as visa liberalization, so as to obtain more 
cooperation from Moscow in negotiations 
concerning Transnistria.
5. With regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
the EU needs to define a consistent and 
coherent policy that applies to both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, particularly on the issue of 
reconciling the principles of self-determination 
of peoples and states’ territorial integrity. The 
current ENP Action Plans with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are contradictory in this respect. 
The EU should also make sure that it gains 
direct access to the negotiations of the OSCE 
Minsk Group, either by taking over France’s 
seat or at least by acquiring observer status.
